Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2020, Page 38-40.

`Folk Psychology' - our everyday talk of beliefs, desires and mental events - has long been compared with the technical language of `Cognitive Science'. Does folk psychology provide a correct account of the mental causes of our behaviour, or must our everyday terms ultimately be replaced by a language developed from computational models and neurobiology? This broad-ranging book addresses these questions, which lie at the heart of psychology and philosophy. Providing a critical overview of the key literature in the field, (...) including the seminal work of Fodor and Churchland, the author explores the classic `Frame Problem' and assesses the future prospects of cognitive science. The scope of the frame problem, touching on connec. (shrink)

Tomasz Ignacy Szpot Dunin SJ w swoim dziele poświęconym historii Chin nie ominął postaw znaczących chińskich dowódców w okresie przełomu historycznego jakim był upadek dynastii Ming i jej zastąpienie przez mandżurską dynastię Qing. Jednym z nich był Wu Sangui, który początkowo wspierał Mingów w walce z zewnętrznymi i wewnętrznymi wrogami, by w kluczowym momencie przyczynić się do powodzenia najazdu mandżurskiego, a po niemal trzech dekadach działania pod zwierzchnością nowej dynastii wypowiedzieć jej posłuszeństwo i stanąć na czele tzw. Rebelii Trzech Lenników. (...) Sprawa ta była znana w Europie i stała się nawet przedmiotem zainteresowania literackiego w XVIII w. Szpot Dunin nie poddaje się w swoim opisie skrajnym tendencjom, umiejętnie rozważa okoliczności decyzji i przedstawia zniuansowany, ale jednocześnie wyrazisty obraz postaci Wu Sangui, jego zamiarów i niepowodzeń. (shrink)

The heart of philosophy is metaphysics, and at the heart of the heart lie two questions about existence. What is it for any contingent thing to exist? Why does any contingent thing exist? Call these the nature question and the ground question, respectively. The first concerns the nature of the existence of the contingent existent; the second concerns the ground of the contingent existent. Both questions are ancient, and yet perennial in their appeal; both have presided over the burial of (...) so many of their would-be undertakers that it is a good induction that they will continue to do so. For some time now, the preferred style in addressing such questions has been deflationary when it has not been eliminativist. Ask Willard Quine what existence is, and you will hear that "Existence is what existential quantification expresses. "! Ask Bertrand Russell what it is for an individual to exist, and he will tell you that an individual can no more exist than it can be numerous: there 2 just is no such thing as the existence of individuals. And of course Russell's eliminativist answer implies that one cannot even ask, on pain of succumbing to the fallacy of complex question, why any contingent individual exists: if no individual exists, there can be no question why any individual exists. Not to mention Russell's modal corollary: 'contingent' and 'necessary' can only be said de dicto (of propositions) and not de re (of things). (shrink)